

The *Sanad* of Jihadi Figures in the Global Terrorism Network

Faiqotul Mala, Ema Marhumah, Agung Danarta

Institut Agama Islam Syarifuddin Lumajang
Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta

faiqo.mala@gmail.com

marhumah@uin-suka.ac.id

Agung.danarta@uin-suka.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This article sheds light on how the radical ideology embraced by terrorist actors in Indonesia is connected to the radical ideology of jihadi figures in the world? This study utilizes a multidisciplinary approach to map the ideological evolution and interconnections among jihadi figures in Indonesia and globally. It integrates historical analysis and ideological mapping to provide a comprehensive understanding. Using *sanad*-based intellectual history theory done by profiling the jihadi figures (from Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab to Aman Abdurrahman) and *sanad* analysis of their ideological and political views, this article finds the connection between the Indonesian Jihadi figures and the global jihadi figures. Also, this article sees that the radical ideology in Indonesia is transmitted through a convincing chain of *sanad* from global jihadi figures. This transmission, at the ends, proves the existence of global radicalism indoctrination.

Keywords: Ideology, Radicalism, Jihadi Figures, Intellectual History, Sanad Study

A. Introduction

The intricate network of ideological influences that shape the worldviews and motivations of radical extremist movements has been highlighted by the recent surge of global terrorism. Indonesia, being the world's largest Muslim-majority country, has been actively involved in combating the rise of homegrown jihadi groups that have established strong connections with international terrorist organizations (Subagyo 2021; Smith 2003).

The fundamental aspect of this matter lies in the intricate web of concepts, explanations, and stories that have been transmitted by prominent jihadi figures, both within Indonesia and internationally. These ideological authorities have played a crucial role in fostering the radicalization of people and the establishment of extremist organizations, utilizing a shared perception of past grievances, religious fervour, and a perceived struggle against unfairness (Atabik and Muhtador 2023)

The proliferation of radical Islamist doctrines in Indonesia can be linked to the introduction of Wahabism and Salafism from the Middle East, which have discovered conducive conditions in the intricate religious and political environment of the nation (Latief 2008). These international movements have established a firm presence in Indonesia, capitalizing on the dissatisfaction of marginalized groups and the perceived hegemony of Western impact (Latief 2008; Subagyo 2021).

Nevertheless, the endeavour to combat the ideological network of militant figures poses a significant challenge, necessitating a comprehensive strategy that deals with the intricate interplay of social, political, and religious elements that underlie the surge of radicalism in the country (Hidayati, Sutikno, and Erawanto 2022).

***Sanad*-based Intellectual History Theory for Tracing the Roots of Radical Ideology**

Intellectual history pertains to the examination of the progression of ideas, beliefs, and ideologies throughout time, often intersecting with disciplines such as literature, science, and philosophy (Livesey 2006). In a larger context, from an Islamic studies perspective, the intellectual history theory and *sanad* studies in *Hadith* have significant connections in terms of source analysis and historical context. In *Hadith* studies, the study of the *sanad* aims to verify the authenticity of the *Hadith* through the chain of narrators who transmitted it from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) to the traditionist (Muttaqin et al. 2023) This involves an in-depth analysis of the credibility of the narrators and the socio-historical conditions that influenced the transmission of the *Hadith* and the *Hadith* itself (Materu et al. 2023). Similarly,

in intellectual history, sources are analysed to ascertain their authenticity and authority and to understand the historical context in which the ideas developed. This approach enables historians to critically trace the origins and development of thought.

The importance of *sanad*-based intellectual history theory in understanding the ideological connections of jihadi figures in Indonesia and globally lies in its ability to trace the origins, transmission and transformation of radical ideology. By analysing intellectual *sanad* involving jihadi figures, we can identify the original sources of their thoughts, as well as how these ideas are transmitted and translated in different social, political and historical contexts. This approach allows us to map the intellectual networks and relationships that connect different jihadi figures and groups, and uncover the dynamics that drive radicalization.

B. Literature Review

The rise of radical Islamic movements has been a concerning phenomenon in Indonesia, where various groups have sought to propagate extreme interpretations of religious beliefs and invoke violence in pursuit of their ideological goals. This scientific literature review aims to examine the processes by which radical ideologies are transmitted among jihadi figures, both within Indonesia and in the broader global context.

The historical roots of radical Islam in Indonesia can be traced back to the colonial and imperialist eras, when political isolation, Western domination, and the suffering of the Indonesian people fostered a growing sense of resentment and a desire for resistance (Subagyo 2021). These grievances were further exacerbated by the introduction of Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies from the Middle East, which resonated with the shared experiences of oppression and struggle (Subagyo 2021)

In the post-New Order era, the Indonesian public sphere has witnessed a resurgence of transnational Islamist and fundamentalist movements, often at the expense of more moderate and progressive Muslim organizations (Latief 2008). Increased communication and interaction with the Middle East have been crucial in the development and transmission of both liberal thought and more extremist ideologies, such as Salafism.

Researchers have argued that the contemporary use of the term "extreme" in the context of religious movements often fails to capture the multidimensional nature of religious identity and practice. Rather than viewing religious extremism solely through the lens of violence,

scholars have proposed a more comprehensive framework that considers the theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions of religious expression (Wibisono, Louis, and Jetten 2019).

In Indonesia, the diversity of Islamic groups has led to a nuanced understanding of religious extremism, where individuals or communities may exhibit extremist tendencies in certain dimensions while maintaining moderate positions in others (Wibisono, Louis, and Jetten 2019). In conclusion, the transmission of radical ideologies among jihadi figures in Indonesia and globally is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.

C. Methodology

This study employs an interdisciplinary approach to delineate the ideological evolution and associations between jihadi figures in Indonesia on a global scale. It incorporates historical scrutiny, ideological delineation, and network analysis to provide comprehensive explanations. The contextualization within a historical framework positions jihadi ideology within significant socio-political occurrences. A meticulous scrutiny of primary sources (writings) and secondary sources (academic publications, reports) in a literature review pinpoints significant figures, underscoring deficiencies in current research. Ideological delineation and comparative evaluation clarify the dissemination and divergence of doctrines, buttressed by *sanad* analysis to map out associations between figures, ideologies, and the contexts.

D. Result and Discussion

Profiling the Jihadis Figures

The *sanad*-based intellectual history plays an important role in determining the connectivity and validity of religious views and certain religious practices. Therefore, this article argues that there is a strong connection between jihadi figures in Indonesia and the global terrorism network. This article will explain in more detail the *sanad* by tracing the profile of global jihadi figure and their connection with jihadi figures in Indonesia. Before looking at the connections, it is necessary to first know the short profile of each jihadi figure as follows:

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab

His full name is Muhammad bin Shaykh 'Abdil Wahhab bin Shaykh Sulaiman bin Buraid bin Musyarrif. He was born in 'Uyainah, Nejed, in 1115 AH/1703 CE and died on Monday of Shawwal in 1206 AH/1791 CE. He died at the age of 92 and was buried in Dir'iyah

cemetery (Husein Khalaf, n.d., 55). He encountered resistance from his family because he had the view to return to the teachings of Islam, he then left 'Uyainah for Basrah. But apparently in Basrah he was expelled until he moved again to Az-Zubair. Those were the trials that Abdul Wahhab felt in his da'wah which actually made him stronger in his stance, creed, and da'wah.(Husein Khalaf, n.d., 62) He tends to aim at purifying monotheism and worship, abandoning blind allegiance, and occupying himself with the Qur'an and Sunnah (As-Sa'di al-Anshari 1420, 121–22).

Abu Al-A'la Al-Maududi (1115—1206 H)

Abu al-A'la Maududi was born in Aurangabad, on 3 Rajab 1321 AH/25 September 1903 AD and died in 1206 AH/1791 AD at the age of 92 (Ma'mur 1997). In 1927, al-Maududi published his first work entitled *Jihad fi al-Islam*, which dealt with “war and peace”. Al-Maududi saw that the founding fathers of Pakistan tended to be inconsistent in implementing Islamic law in the life of the state. Al-Maududi's struggle was often perceived as a threat by the rulers, hence al-Maududi was imprisoned four times. In 1953 Al-Maududi was sentenced to death for the Ahmadiyya Qadiani sect case. Despite this, Al-Maududi preferred to die rather than apologize. Al-Maududi's determination shook the Pakistani government, so that his death sentence was changed to a life sentence (Adiputra 2016). Al-Maududi argued that the State established to implement the *khilafah* system must be obeyed by the people in matters that are *ma'ruf* and it is not obligatory to obey anything that is contrary to the Shari'ah and legislation of Allah

Abdullah bin Baz

His full name is 'Abdul 'Azi>z bin 'Abdurrah}ma>n bin 'Abdullah bin 'Azi>z bin Ba>z. He was born in Riyadh on the 12th of Dhul Hijjah in 1330 AH and died in 1420 AH at the age of 89 (bin Baz 2003, 14). He had headed various institutions, including the head of the founding body of Rabithah 'Alam Islami, head of the International High Council for Mosque affairs, head of the Islamic Fiqh Institute (al-Mujamma' al-Fiqh al-Isla>miy) in Mecca (bin Baz 2003, 14–15). Bin Baz has many works, such as *Durus lisy Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz*, *Majmu' Fatawa ash-Syaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz* which is a collection of fatwas in 30 volumes. The scientific works he wrote have their own characteristics, concise, dense, weighty, and easy to understand, so they are in great demand by many people, and even become the main reference in addressing contemporary matters that are *mushkil* (Khusairi 2014).

Abdullah Azzam

His full name is Abdullah Yusuf Azzam born in the village of As-ba'ah Al-Hartiyeh in 1941. From a young age, he was known as a pious, steadfast, diligent and earnest figure (Scott-Smith, Farida, and Droogan 2023) In 1967 Sheikh Azzam moved to Jordan and joined the Palestinian *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (McGregor 2003).

Abdullah Azzam promised to continue jihad until the end of blood. His aspiration to die as a mujahid made him a reference figure for the ummah in terms of jihad. Several assassination attempts were received by Abdullah Azzam. Until finally on November 24, 1989, three bombs were deliberately detonated on the road that Abdullah Azzam passed, when he parked the vehicle for Friday prayers in Peshawar, Pakistan. Along with his two sons, Muhammad and Ibrahim, Abdullah Azzam died instantly. His vehicle was in shambles. His son, was thrown 100 M and their bodies were all destroyed (Ismail 2014).

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

His full name is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir alias Abdus Samad has the full name Abu Bakar Ba'asyir bin Abu Bakar Abud, he was born in Jombang on August 17, 1938, his father was named Abu Ahmad Ba'asyir and his mother Halimah, the youngest of seven children was left by his father since he was a child. He took education starting from elementary, junior high, high school in Jombang then continued to the Gontor Ponorogo Islamic Boarding School and graduated in 1959. In 1959, he studied at Al-Irsyad University Surakarta, majoring in Da'wah (Adnan et al. 2023).

In 1993, Ba'asyir and Sungkar formed a new organization called Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Sungkar became its Amir, but in 1997 JI was handed over Camp Hudaibiyah Mindanao, a military training camp owned by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Sungkar then stepped down. Since then JI can be said to be paralyzed and only 'wild' combatants remain. In 2002 Ba'asyir formed the Indonesian Mujahidin Council, and became its chairman, this organization has a mission to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia. Therefore, when the Bali bombings occurred, Ba'asyir was predicted to be the mastermind of the tragedy, while he denied his involvement in the Bali bombings. On March 3, 2005, Ba'asyir was sentenced to 2.6 years in prison and released on June 14, 2006. Ba'asyir resigned as Amir of MMI. On September 17, 2008, he founded Jamâah Anshârut Tauhîd (JAT) (Abdullah 2018). In 2010 Ba'asyir was again detained by the Indonesian Police in Banjar on charges of cultivating an Al Qaida branch in Aceh. Finally on June 16, 2011, Ba'asyir was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Until now, Ba'asyir is a prisoner of terrorism in Nusakambangan prison (Sholeh 2016).

Ba'asyir's most famous work is *Tadzkiroh*, which he wrote during his imprisonment at the National Police Headquarters. In addition to referring to the Qur'an and *Hadith*, Ba'asyir wrote this book by quoting the opinions of scholars, including Imam Qurthubi, Imam Baidhawi, a great Saudi scholar, Shaykh Abdurrahman As Sa'di, Shaykh Abdullah Azzam. (Ba'asyir 2013).

Al-Maqdisi

Al-Maqdisi's full name is Abu Muhammad 'Abdullah bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Qudamah bin Miqdam bin Nasir al-Maqdisi al-Jama'ili. He was born in the village of Jama'ili, located in Nables region in 1378 H (1959 AD) Nablus province, Palestine (Wagemakers 2013). He died in Damascus, coinciding with 'Eid al-Fitr 620 H.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point cites Al-Maqdisi as a key ideologue in the world of intellectual jihad (McCants 2006, 8). He is also called as the spiritual father of the al-Qaida Movement, so he is considered one of the most prominent radical Islamic ideologues in the world. His writings are a source of reference for terrorists in both Saudi Arabia and Jordan (Middle East Report N°47 2005). He has a very large number of written works including *Kitab al-Mughni*, *al-Kafi*, *I'tiqad Lum'atul al-Muqni* etc.

Al-Maqdisi's most famous works is *Millah Ibrahim* which brings up the importance of the concept of *al-Wala' wal-Barra'*. This concept he created and tried to develop by turning it into a theory of hostility towards political rulers who were considered infidel (Wagemakers 2013) This theory led to the necessity of home schooling, because for Al-Maqdisi, public schools were un-Islamic institutions that would corrupt the younger generation. al-Maqdisi adopted this concept *al-Wala' wal-Barra'* from Juhaiman al-'Utaybi, a leader of the group that revolted and occupied the Masjidil Haram Mosque in 1979. This concept is based on the Qur'anic verse 60:4 where the phrase Millah Ibrahim or Abrahamic religion has been mentioned in the Qur'an and has been used in contemporary politics before by Juhayman (a puritanical salafi jihadi), a leader of the group that revolted and occupied the Grand Mosque in 1979.

Osama Bin Laden

Osama's full name is Usamah bin Muhammad bin Awwad bin Ladin, born in 1957 in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. Osama is the 17th of 52 children. Osama was born into a wealthy family,

his father was the largest construction in the Saudi kingdom, so he was very familiar with the King family (Johnson, Lehman, and Matthijs 2002)

When Osama fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1970s, he experienced a transformational experience in himself, he was willing to use his personal funds to come to Afghanistan and build a hospital. Osama was also willing to leave his wealth and live in a cave with his followers. For Osama and his followers, the Soviet Union was nothing more than an easily defeated piece of paper, so he set his next target on the United States. After achieving victory in Afghanistan, Osama continued his jihad and was determined to expand his vision of continuing jihad throughout the world in order to reconstruct the Islamic State all over the world (Post 2002).

Osama was captured on May 2, 2011 and killed in a US military raid on his long time hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan (Dahl 2014). US forces conducted DNA tests to confirm Osama's death. Osama's body was evacuated by helicopter from Abbottabad and then flown to an American aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean and his remains were buried at sea (Medelton 2011).

Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi

Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's real name is Ahmad Fadil al-Khalayleh, born in October 1966 in Zarqa, a city north of Amman, Jordan, near the Palestinian refugee camp. Zarqawi comes from the Bani Hassan family, one of the East Bank Bedouin tribes that served the Jordanian Hashemite royal family. In 1984 Zarqawi's father died and left the family in poverty, Zarqawi became frustrated in his youth and dropped out of high school. Because of this, he began to join a local gang who were habitual drinkers and bullies (Napoleoni 2009).

In the mid-1990s, Zarqawi formed the Tawhid or Unity group, which was funded by the Afghan Taliban government and focused on training suicide bombers at camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hudson Teslik 2008). Despite Zarqawi's wasted youth, it is precisely his failures in youth that make him the most frightening person. In 2003 Zarqawi and his followers declared a movement called jama'ah Al-Tauhid Wal jihad, this name was adopted from the name of the jihadi movement founded by al-Maqqdisi. then in October 2004 Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al-Qaidah leader Osama Bin Laden and then changed the name of the movement into *Jama'ah li Tanzim al-Qaidah lil Jihadi fi Bilad al-Rafidin* also known as *Tanzim al-Qaidah fi al-Iraq*. In 2006 Zarqawi and his followers formed a coalition and joined jihadi organizations in the Iraqi region, forming a collective jihad movement called the al-Mujahideen Shoura Council. He announced the formation of this assembly on an Iraqi TV

news broadcast. A month after the formation of the assembly surah Mujahideen Zarqawi was killed (Gunawan et al. 2017)

Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi

His full name is Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Husseini Al-Qurashi, he was also known previously as Ibrahim Awad al-Badri, born in 1971 in the city of Samarra, central Iraq (Christiastuti 2019). After finishing school in early 1990 he moved to the capital, Baghdad. As a teenager he was called a believer because he often spent time in mosques, studying the Quran. As a student, he lived near a Sunni mosque located in northwestern Baghdad, which is populated by both Sunnis and Shias. Since then, he has been believed to embrace Salafism and jihadism. Al-Baghdadi eventually obtained his Ph.D at the University of Islamic Sciences in the Adhamiya area of Baghdad. He concentrated his studies on Islamic culture, history, law and jurisprudence. Although he did not have a degree from a Sunni religious institution such as the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia or al-Azhar University in Cairo, but he had more Islamic knowledge than other al-Qaida leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Aymen al-Zawahiri (Y Zelin 2014).

In 2005 the father of five children swore allegiance to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, an Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq. But when Zarqawi was killed in 2006, as well as his successor Abu Umar al-Baghdadi who died in a US attack in 2010, al-Baghdadi took over the leadership. He rebuilt the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) until it expanded into Syria. But then he broke away from Al-Qaeda in 2013. Finally, in 2014 Baghdadi was able to control a number of areas in Syria and Iraq by establishing a government system and was able to recruit many people to join and declare his 'caliphate' (Makrum 2016). The ISIS caliphate declaration, carried out from Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, sparked violence that killed thousands of civilians, displaced millions from their homes and influenced world powers to get involved in regional conflicts. Al-Baghdadi often moves from place to place to avoid being pursued by authorities, he oversees ISIS from an unknown location, which is why he is nicknamed the 'Ghost' because without much public appearance, he can still lead ISIS (Warrick and Mekhennet 2022).

Aman Abdurrahman

Oman Rochman Bin Ade Sudarma alias Abu Sulaiman, better known as Aman Abdurrahman, was born on January 5, 1972 in Sumedang, West Java (Munip 2023). Aman began his education at SD Cimalaka, Sumedang, West Java, then he continued to MTSN Sumedang, as well as following the “*ngaji kalong*” at Pondok al-Taubah Sumedang. It was

there that he learned religious knowledge. He then continued his education at the Darussalam Ciamis boarding school. At that *pesantren*, he studied books of tafsir such as Tafsir Jalalain, Tafsir Ibn Kasir, and others. Aman then continued his studies at the Institute of Islamic and Arabic knowledge (LIPIA) Jakarta, for 7 years Aman completed the study at the campus which is a branch of Muhammad Ibn Su'ud University Riyad Saudi Arabia.(Mustofa 2018).

Aman began to enter the radical movement when he joined the NII in Aceh, then he formed the Tauhid wal Jihad organization which changed its name to *Ansar Daulah* (Ramelan 2017, 209). For his followers, Aman is considered an ideologue who has a strong religious background. He is an influential person who can control even from behind the jail and is then obeyed by his followers outside of detention (Wiwoho 2017). In 2004 Aman was involved in a case of exploding homemade bombs in the Cimanggis area, he then went to prison and was released in 2008. In 2010 Aman participated in military training in Jalin Jantho, Aceh Besar, causing him to go to prison for the second time and was sentenced to 9 years.

While in prison, Aman translated a book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, spreading it among militants on a massive scale. Aman's thinking was heavily influenced by Ibn Taimiyyah, Sayid Qutub, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi (Gunawan et al. 2017, 92). The works written by Aman include; *Tegar di Atas Tauhid, Sudahkan Anda Kafir Kepada Tagut? Di mana posisi Kamu, di Barisan Pembela Tauhid atau Barisan Pembela Tagut?, Fir'aunisme Masa Kini, Syirik Rububiyyah, Ayah Ibu bergabunglah bersama Kami, Syirik di Dalam Hukum Seperti Syirik di Dalam Ibadah*, and many other articles and books then sold online through his personal blog milillahi Ibrahim.wordpress.com. This blog then developed into a website since 2013 with the addresses millahibrahim.org and millahibrahim-news.com (Assad 2014).

Aman is said to be a person who is good at influencing people's ideology (2018). Therefore, Aman is a reference for extremist groups in Indonesia and is known as the person who unites various pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia into one place. In 2018, Aman was proven to be involved in a series of terrorist acts since 2016 such as the 2016 Sarinah bombing, the 2017 Samarinda church bombing, the 2017 Kampung Melayu bombing, and the stabbing of officers at the North Sumatra Police Headquarters. That's why he was demanded the death penalty by the public prosecutor (JPU) from the South Jakarta District Attorney's Office.

To provide a clearer picture of the scientific continuity between the jihadi figures mentioned above, the following is a *sanad* of the scientific continuity of the jihadi figures:




Figure 1.
Ideological Lineage Chart of Jihadi Figures

_____ : means meeting and interacting directly

----- : means not meet in person, but often referenced opinions or writings

The *Sanad* of Radical Ideology among Jihadi Figures

After looking at the previous short profile of each jihadi figures, it can be concluded that the connection, linkage or relationship between jihadi figures is quite strong, where the relationship is shown by the existence of similar views, principles and attitudes, hence the knowledge among them is related to each other. Although they did not live in the same area, some of them lived at the same time, still allowing them to work together. There are also those who lived in different times, conditions and generations, but still shared the same views from previous figures. In this case, I will further discuss the connection of jihadi figures in two aspects; ideological and political.

Ideological Connection (Ar. *Ittisal al-Sanad al-Idiyulujiy*) among Jihadi Figures

Jihadi leaders seek to build an ideological framework called Islamism, whose most important foundation is to make Islam not only a religion but also a system that underlies all aspects of life. When Islam is not embodied in a state, it stops at rituals and moral teachings. This view is evident from the similarity of Al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutub's thoughts on the purpose of jihad, where the main goal is not to force people to convert to Islam, but to destroy systems that are not based on Islam and replace them with systems based on Islam (divine) (Gunawan et al. 2017, 160).

The similarity of the jihadi ideology lies in their belief in jihad as a medium for da'wah. This is as Ibn Taimiyyah argues that da'wah cannot be carried out without fighting the infidels. So da'wah and jihad must be carried out simultaneously (Ibnu Taimiyyah 1988, 72–74). Jihad according to Ibn Taimiyyah devotes all abilities to achieve the pleasure of Allah and reject all that is forbidden by Him. Ibn Taimiyyah sees that jihad can be done with hands directly, with the heart, with the tongue, ideas and rules and positive activities. All of that must be endeavored as much as possible (Ibnu Taimiyyah 1995, 310). Everyone who does jihad will definitely reap one of two benefits, between getting victory and if it does not succeed it will meet martyrdom and paradise. (Ibnu Taimiyyah 1995, 124). If a person abandons jihad then he will lose two happiness both in this world and in the hereafter (Ibnu Taimiyyah 1980, 125)

Ibn Taimiyah's thinking then influenced Abdul Wahab, he admired ibn Taimiyah so much that the principle of purifying the creed carried by Abdul Wahab was based on the opinion of ibn Taimiyah. Abdul Wahhab argues that jihad must be with an imam, meaning that there must be an imam who leads, organizes, prepares all the needs. Therefore, jihad must be under the flag of an imam so that the jihad is successful. Even though the imam is a wicked

and unjust person, he still has the right to jihad and the right to be obeyed in jihad (al-Fauzan 1426, 121–22).

The concept of jihad is closely related to the concept of takfir, according to Abdil Wahhab, in the Qur'an Allah obliges all His servants to disbelieve Thagut, and believe only in Allah. According to him, there are five forms of thaghut; the devil cursed, people who worship other than Allah, people who claim to know the unseen, people who invite people to worship themselves, people who judge with other than Allah's law (an-Najdi 1417, 136). He emphasized that he does not disbelieve a Muslim because of his sins, but disbelieves the shirkers who disbelieve in Allah, such as praying to others as if they were praying to Allah (an-Najdi 1417, 311).

This concept of *takfir* stems from the rejection of actions that are considered bid'ah, in this case one of the jihadi figures who strongly rejected bid'ah was Abdul Aziz bin Baz. He believes that all innovations are heresies that must be avoided. He even uses the term “mungkar” to refer to heresy. For him, the only acceptable form of worship is that which is based on the Quran and *Hadith* as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Bin Baz considered that religious practices were unacceptable if they were not based on the authentic sources of Islam (Farah 2014).

In addition, Bin Baz also discussed jihad, he divided jihad into three periods. First period; Muslims are obliged to fight without any obligation about it. Second; Muslims are commanded to fight only those who attack them, and should not fight those who do not attack them. Third period: Muslims are commanded to fight the polytheists absolutely, whether they attack them or not (Dawam 2018).

In line with Bin Baz, Abdullah Azzam also issued a fatwa that Jihad is Fardhu 'Ain at this time (Daud 2008, 26). The fatwa is targeted at apostates and infidels. Such as the Shi'a Nushairiyah sect and the Ba'athist political sect which in Abdullah Azzam's view they include infidels, so that the consequences of the infidelity is murder (Lea-Henry 2018). It is aimed at realizing Tawhid and establishing an Islamic State by militarizing Islamic youth, so as to fight apostates and those who carry out attacks and also fight Ahl al-Baqarah (Muthoifin and Muzakkir 2017).

Political Connection (Ar. *Ittisal al-Sanad al-Siyasiy*) among Jihadi Figures

The similarity of political views among jihadi figures comes from the idea that the legal basis of a state is God's law contained in the Qur'an, not human-made law. This view is called the concept of *Al-Hakimiyah* pioneered by Al-Maududi. According to al-Maududi that

legislation (Ha>kimiyyatulla>h al-Qa>nu>niyyah) which is based on Quran Ar-Ra'd, verse 37, shows that obedience is only to Allah alone. It is forbidden if someone follows man-made laws because of the tendency of the emergence of lust in making laws. with reference to Q.S Al-Maidah, verses 44, 45, 47, he argued that the law that contradicts the law of God is an act of disbelief and is considered unbelievers (al-Maududi 1978, 17)

Goes in line with al-Maududi's views, Osama bin Laden, who was one of Abdullah Azzam's followers, was also of the view that Islam was not just a religion, but that Islam shaped his political beliefs that could influence his every decision. Osama did not like to see how Western culture developed and influenced the lives of people in the Middle East. That's why Osama bin Laden then founded an organization called al-Qaeda (Bigliardi 2020). Osama eventually changed the name of his movement to *Tanzim al-Qaidah fi al-Iraq*. This movement triggered Zarqowi to pledge allegiance to Osama, after a year he and his followers declared a movement called *Jama'ah Al-Tauhid Wal Jihad*, this name was adopted from the movement founded by al-Maqdisi

Al-Maqdisi, on the other hand, had a good relationship with Aiman Azawahiri, (Osama bin Laden's successor as leader of al Qaidah). He echoed the jargon “worship Allah and stay away from thaghut”, the jargon became the reason for writing the book *Millah Ibrahim*. Where almost the entire explanation in the book is aligned with the views of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, especially with regard to the commandment of worship only to Allah, hold fast to all of its teachings and disbelieve those who leave it.

Al-Maqdisi's anti-government view is also shared by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In Indonesia, Ba'asyir rejected the implementation of Pancasila as the principle of the State. The rejection was often discussed in a private radio broadcast called RADIS (Radio Dakwah Islamiyyah), the radio was later banned by the new order government. Ba'asyir's passion did not stop there, on March 10, 1972, Ba'asyir established the Al Mu'min pesantren in Ngruki, Central Java. Ba'asyir forbade his students to salute the flag during ceremonies because it was considered shirk. He also often criticized the Indonesian government for not enforcing its governance laws based on Islamic law. Ba'asyir was later arrested on charges of inciting others by rejecting the principles of Pancasila. he was sentenced to 9 years in prison. Apart from Ba'asyir, Aman also openly criticized the democratic system in Indonesia and considered it as shirk akbar. The ISIS pioneer views democracy in Indonesia as akin to worshipping idols that can cancel one's Islamic faith.

E. Conclusion

This article traced the connection between the figures of radical movements in the world and their thoughts and presents the connection of radical figures in Indonesia with global terrorism network by describing their profiles and analyzing their ideological and political connection. From the perspective of *Hadith* studies, the existence of ideological and political links between jihadi figures in Indonesia and jihadi figures in the world shows that the radical ideology that has emerged in Indonesia is actually not rooted in the Indonesian intellectual religious traditions but is transmitted through a series of indoctrination processes. This transmission, at the ends, proves the existence of global radicalism indoctrination.

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